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Abstract
People often forget acquired knowledge over time such as names of former classmates.
Which knowledge people can access, however, may modify the judgment process and affect
judgment accuracy. Specifically, we hypothesized that judgments based on retrieving past
exemplars from long-term memory may be more vulnerable to forgetting than remembering
rules that relate the cues to the criterion. Experiment 1 systematically tracked the
individual course of forgetting from initial learning to later tests (immediate, one day, and
one week) in a linear judgment task facilitating rule-based strategies and a multiplicative
judgment task facilitating exemplar-based strategies. Practicing the acquired judgment
strategy in repeated tests helped participants to consistently apply the learnt judgment
strategy and retain a high judgment accuracy even after a week. Yet, whereas a long
retention interval did not affect judgments in the linear task, a long retention interval
impaired judgments in the multiplicative task. If practice was restricted as in Experiment
2, judgment accuracy suffered in both tasks. In addition, after a week without practice
participants tried to reconstruct their judgments by applying rules in the multiplicative
task. These results emphasize that the extent to which decision makers can still retrieve
previously learned knowledge limits their ability to make accurate judgments and that the
preferred strategies change over time if the opportunity for practice is limited.
Keywords: Judgment, forgetting, rule-based and exemplar-based processes
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Tracing the path of forgetting in rule abstraction and exemplar retrieval
One of the earliest discovered laws in psychology is the law of forgetting. The more
time has passed between encoding an item and retrieving this item, that is the longer the
retention interval is, the less likely people recall the item correctly (Ebbinghaus, 1885;
Rubin & Wenzel, 1996). On a class reunion one year after high school, for instance, the
names of former classmates may easily come to your mind. Twenty years later, however,
you may even encounter problems when naming your former best friends. The course of
time makes remembering facts, such as the names of previous classmates (Bahrick,
Bahrick, & Wittlinger, 1975), or past events, such as headlines in newspapers (Meeter,
Murre, & Janssen, 2005), more difficult.
If people forget information with the passage of time, this should also limit their
ability to use this information when making judgments and decisions, affecting judgment
quality. Although knowledge about how judgment accuracy varies as time passes by is
limited (Ashton, 2000), it seems that not all judgments are equally affected by the time
that has passed. For instance, meteorological forecasters have been shown to be more
consistent than forecasters in the business or medical domain (Ashton, 2000). This domain
difference could be due to people retrieving different information from memory depending
on the judgment strategy they rely on.
Suppose, for instance, a hiker tries to forecast every weekend how much rain will fall
on a scale from 0 to 40 mm per hour. To judge the precipitation, the hiker may consider
how cloudy it is, which shape those clouds have and how strongly the wind blows. If the
hiker correctly remembers how important each of those predictors is to forecast the rainfall
and applies this policy consistently, her judgment should be independent of the time that
passed since her last hike or the number of times she went hiking before.
Alternatively, the hiker may judge the precipitation by remembering how much rain
fell on previous hiking tours and how similar the weather conditions are to the weather
conditions on previous trips. In this case the judgment will depend on how well the hiker
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remembers these past hiking tours. Accordingly, if the weather conditions on previous
tours are remembered less well the more time has passed, forecasting the rainfall for the
current hike should vary depending on the previous hikes that can still be retrieved.
In sum, to predict how judgment accuracy changes over time it is necessary to
understand which knowledge people retrieve when making a judgment and how knowledge
retrieval changes with the passage of time. So far, however, this question has hardly been
studied. The goal of the present research is to fill this gap and to investigate how the
passage of time between learning a judgment task and making subsequent judgments
influences judgment accuracy and interacts with the way people form their judgments. In
the following we will describe the different judgment strategies people may follow and how
they may be affected by forgetting in more detail.
Judgment strategies
Evaluating how much rain will fall on a hike requires inferring a continuous criterion,
the precipitation, based on a number of features or cues of the judgment object, such as
the shape of the clouds and the wind intensity. People learn to solve these judgment tasks
by getting feedback about the correct criterion. Judgment research has emphasized the
idea that people can base such judgments on two types of judgment strategies: rule-based
and exemplar-based (Erickson & Kruschke, 1998; Juslin, Karlsson, & Olsson, 2008; Juslin,
Olsson, & Olsson, 2003; von Helversen & Rieskamp, 2008, 2009). These two strategies
differ in the way they represent and process knowledge (Hahn & Chater, 1998; Juslin et al.,
2003). Rule-based strategies assume that people try to test hypotheses about how each cue
relates to the criterion (Brehmer, 1994; Juslin et al., 2008). To judge a new object, people
integrate the weighted cue information linear additively (Einhorn, Kleinmuntz, &
Kleinmuntz, 1979; Juslin et al., 2003). For instance, dark piled clouds may be judged as
predicting more rain. Accordingly, this judgment process requires storing the weight
assigned to each cue in long-term memory whereas information about previously
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encountered objects can be forgotten (Hoffmann, von Helversen, & Rieskamp, 2014;
von Helversen & Rieskamp, 2009).
In comparison, exemplar-based judgment strategies assume that people store every
previously encountered object, the exemplars, and their associated criterion values in
long-term memory (Juslin et al., 2008; Juslin et al., 2003; Nosofsky, 1988). To make a
judgment, people retrieve all encountered objects from long-term memory and compare the
current object (the probe) to all exemplars. The more similar the probe is to an exemplar,
the more this exemplar influences the judgment. Hence, according to exemplar-based
judgment strategies the hiker stores each previous hike and the weather conditions in
long-term memory. The more the weather conditions match the weather conditions on a
previous hike spoiled by rain, the higher will she judge the amount of precipitation.
Research suggests that people can adopt both kinds of judgment strategies, but shift
between those strategies depending on the structure of the task (Juslin et al., 2008; Juslin
et al., 2003; Karlsson, Juslin, & Olsson, 2007; Pachur & Olsson, 2012; Platzer & Bröder,
2013; von Helversen & Rieskamp, 2009) and characteristics of the decision maker
(Hoffmann et al., 2014; Little & McDaniel, 2015; von Helversen, Mata, & Olsson, 2010).
Specifically, it has been argued that people are restricted to test linear rules because the
comparison processes involved in finding out the importance of each cue are capacity
constrained and thus only act upon two successively presented objects (Juslin et al., 2003;
Pachur & Olsson, 2012). As a result, on which strategy people rely on should vary with the
functional relationship between the cues and the criterion (for a review on effects of
functional form across different tasks see Hoffmann, von Helversen, & Rieskamp, 2016;
Juslin et al., 2008; Karlsson et al., 2007, 2008). In linear tasks, in which the criterion is a
linear, additive function of the cues, people can assess the independent contribution of each
cue to the criterion by comparing the difference in attribute values for two judgment
objects at a time. In comparison, testing the independent effect of each cue should fail in
multiplicative tasks, in which the criterion is a multiplicative function of the cues.
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Accordingly, people should deliberately give up testing linear rules and instead memorize
single exemplars to solve the judgment task (Karlsson et al., 2008). In line with this idea,
it has been found that linear regression models, the predominant account to describe
rule-based judgment strategies (Cooksey, 1996; Juslin et al., 2003), capture people’s
judgments well in linear judgment tasks. In contrast, exemplar models more accurately
describe and predict participants’ judgments in multiplicative tasks (Hoffmann et al., 2014,
2016; Juslin et al., 2008; Karlsson et al., 2007, 2008; von Helversen & Rieskamp, 2009).
In sum, both rule-based and exemplar-based strategies require to some extent storage
in and retrieval from episodic memory, but which kind of knowledge is stored and retrieved
varies between the strategies. Whereas rule-based strategies assume that people need to
store and retrieve each cue’s importance, exemplar-based strategies rely on storage and
retrieval of past exemplars. Accordingly, both judgment strategies may be disrupted over
time by forgetting, but forgetting may harm rules and exemplars to a different degree.
Sources of forgetting in rule-based and exemplar-based judgments
To what extent people forget information over time is a function of how well the
information has been learned initially and if it can be successfully retrieved after some time
has passed. The time that passed, however, may not cause forgetting per se, but rather
what happened during this time (McGeoch, 1932; Rubin & Wenzel, 1996). Specifically,
memory research has postulated two major mechanisms that may cause forgetting: a decay
of stored memory traces and interference of similar items (for a historical review see
Roediger III, Weinstein, & Agarwal, 2010). Decay theories postulate that memory traces
get weaker over time without accessing them. In contrast, interference theories postulate
that storing similar items harms retrieval of the to-be-remembered items (Anderson &
Neely, 1996; Postman, 1971). Accordingly, other memories compete with the target
memory for retrieval and make it more difficult to retrieve the specific target item
(Anderson, Bjork, & Bjork, 1994). Which mechanism underlies forgetting over a long time
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interval is hard to determine, but considering concepts from memory research may inform
our understanding about how forgetting may affect retrieval of previously learned rules or
exemplars.
Judgment tasks can be thought of as paired-associates learning tasks (Siegel & Siegel,
1972): During learning, people need to form an association between each cue and its
importance in rule-based judgments, whereas they need to associate the exemplar (that is,
a combination of cues) with its criterion value in exemplar-based judgments. During
retrieval, the cues of the presented probe serve as retrieval cues for either the rule or the
exemplar.
In rule-based judgments, it has been proposed that people abstract the importance of
each cue and adjust (or update) its importance over trials (Hoffmann et al., 2014; Juslin
et al., 2008; Pachur & Olsson, 2012). Once a participant has formed a satisfying rule, this
rule can be applied to each object. The established rule is hence practiced on every trial.
Furthermore, the rule may generalize across different exemplars so that presenting a probe
with a different combination of cues interferes with rule retrieval only to a small extent. As
a result, rule-based judgments may not be harmed strongly by forgetting. Supporting this
idea, Balzer, Rohrbaugh, and Murphy (1983) have found that judgments predicted from a
rule-based regression model show a high test-retest reliability even after a week. Actual
judgments, however, were less stable over time suggesting that forgetting still intrudes to
some degree.
In exemplar-based judgments, it has been proposed that people store each exemplar
in a separate memory trace (Estes, 1986). Frequently presented objects are more often
encoded facilitating subsequent retrieval of the exemplar. Which exemplar is most similar
to the probe, however, varies from trial to trial so that previously stored exemplars are
practiced less often and may decay. Furthermore, stored exemplars likely share the same
cue value on a particular cue so that the same cue value may activate exemplars with
different criterion values and the association between a specific cue and the judgment is
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more variable. This overlap may increase competition between exemplars, disrupt
discrimination between stored exemplars and, in turn, harm retrieval (Capaldi & Neath,
1995). In this vein, it has been found that people follow exemplar-based strategies less, if
they cannot discriminate past exemplars from each other (Rouder & Ratcliff, 2004). In
sum, exemplar-based judgment strategies may be more prone to forgetting than rule-based
judgment strategies.
Previous studies indeed suggest that forgetting may harm retrieval of previously
encountered exemplars more than retrieval of previously learned rules. In dot pattern
classification paradigms, abstracted prototypes are better remembered over time than
single instances (Homa, Cross, Cornell, Goldman, & Shwartz, 1973; Posner & Keele, 1970;
Robbins et al., 1978). Furthermore, a recent study applying the looking-at-nothing
paradigm found some evidence that people retrieve past exemplars more often in
exemplar-based judgments than in rule-based judgments (Scholz, von Helversen, &
Rieskamp, 2015). In the looking-at-nothing paradigm (Richardson & Spivey, 2000)
participants are presented with objects at different locations. During retrieval, participants
tend to look back to the location at which the object they recall was presented suggesting
that gaze location indicates which objects people retrieve. Using this looking-at-nothing
paradigm, Scholz et al. (2015) found that people who base judgments on similarity look
back more often to the location of previously seen similar exemplars than those who base
judgments on rules.
If people do not remember previously encountered exemplars well after a long time
interval, how can they still solve an exemplar-based judgment task? There is good reason
to believe that people try to apply ill-conceived rules if previous exemplars cannot be
retrieved (Olsson, Enkvist, & Juslin, 2006). In line with this idea, work relating memory
abilities to judgment strategies has found that people with a better episodic memory more
frequently adopt an exemplar-based strategy and, in turn, solve exemplar-based judgment
tasks more accurately (Hoffmann et al., 2014). Furthermore, people who state that they
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relied on memory categorize new items more often based on similarity than those who
indicated that they learned a rule (Little & McDaniel, 2015). Finally, Bourne, Healy, Kole,
and Graham (2006) investigated how participants’ stated classification strategy developed
over the course of learning and changed after a one-week retention interval in different
alphabetical categorization tasks. In the easy and difficult artificial tasks, participants
indicated that rule use dominated early in learning, but over the course of learning more
memory-based strategies evolved. After a week, however, participants stated that they
relearned both tasks by applying a rule and, furthermore, did not revert to the
memory-based strategy in the easy task. Accordingly, Bourne et al. (2006) argued that a
longer retention interval induces a shift from memory-based to rule-based strategies
because rules are better remembered than single instances.
Rationale of the current experiments
Taken together, both rule-based and exemplar-based judgments may involve to some
extent storage in and retrieval from long-term memory: In rule-based judgment, people
need to retrieve the previously learned rules. In exemplar-based judgment, they need to
retrieve previously encountered exemplars and their criterion values. Rules are practiced on
every trial and likely generalize across exemplars, whereas previously stored exemplars may
be practiced less often and compete for retrieval. Accordingly, prolonging the retention
interval between a training and a test phase may harm retrieval of single exemplars more
than retrieval of rules.
To manipulate which type of strategy people rely on we varied the functional
relationship between the cues and the criterion from a linear to a multiplicative one. In
both task structures, participants judge the same objects, but the criterion value associated
with each object varies between linear and multiplicative tasks. Linear tasks allow
assessing the independent contribution of each cue to the criterion and thus applying linear
rules is a viable strategy (Juslin et al., 2008). In comparison, multiplicative tasks require
FORGETTING IN JUDGMENT 11
associating a combination of cues with the criterion value, but cannot be solved adequately
by testing the independent effect of each cue so that participants should be more likely to
rely on exemplar-based strategies (Hoffmann et al., 2014, 2016; Juslin et al., 2008; Karlsson
et al., 2007; von Helversen & Rieskamp, 2009). Consequently, we expected a stronger
decline in judgment accuracy in multiplicative judgment tasks, which are more likely solved
by exemplar memory than in linear judgment tasks in which people should predominantly
try to abstract rules.
We tested this prediction in two experiments: Experiment 1 tracks the individual
path of forgetting by asking participants to solve either a linear or a multiplicative
judgment task and repeatedly retrieve the learned knowledge: immediately, after a day, and
after a week. In Experiment 2, we further explore the link between forgetting and judgment
accuracy by manipulating the retention interval between participants from immediate recall
to recall after a week. Finally, we further tested to what degree forgetting may influence
which cognitive strategies people tend to follow at each time point (Bourne et al., 2006).
Experiment 1: Forgetting over time with repeated practice
To test our hypotheses, we trained participants in the present study to predict the
criterion value for a number of objects using four cues. In this training session, participants
were randomly assigned to one of two judgment tasks: a linear judgment task to induce a
rule-based judgment strategy or a multiplicative judgment task to induce an
exemplar-based judgment strategy. To induce forgetting, we asked participants to judge
old items (objects encountered in training) as well as new items (unknown objects)
repeatedly at three retention intervals: an immediate test session, a test session after one
day, and a test session after one week.
Method
Participants. 83 participants (53 female, 30 male, MAge = 24.6, SDAge = 6.5) were
recruited at the University of Basel and randomly assigned to the linear (n = 41) or the
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multiplicative task (n = 42). Two participants who did not show up for all sessions were
excluded from the study (one participant in the linear, and one in the multiplicative task)
as well as one who was assigned to the wrong task in one of the sessions. Participants
received course credit or 20 Swiss Francs (CHF) per hour for participating in the
experiment. In addition, they could earn a bonus based on their judgment performance (M
= 6.06 CHF, SD = 2.11 CHF). The first session took about an hour, whereas the second
and the third lasted approximately 30 minutes.
Design and material. The cover story asked participants to predict how long the
pupal stage lasts for different fictitious butterfly species on a scale from 10 to 20 days. The
butterflies’ appearance differed in four binary features (the cues): wing color (red vs.
violet), antennae color (black vs. orange), color of stripes (brown or pink), and shape of
spots (oval or serrated). Figure 1 shows two sample butterfly species with different cue
values on all cues. These cues could be used to predict how long the pupal stage for a
butterfly lasts (the criterion). In the linear judgment task, the criterion was a linear,
additive function of the cues,
ylin = 4x1 + 3x2 + 2x3 + x4 + 10. (1)
Each cue, x1, x2, x3, and x4, could take a cue value of zero or one. The cue weights
were randomly assigned to the four pictorial cues, as were the cue values (zero or one) to
the features (e.g., oval or serrated spots). In the multiplicative judgment task, the criterion
was a nonlinear, multiplicative function of the cues:
ymult = 9 + e(4x1+3x2+2x3+x4)/4.15 (2)
Table 1 illustrates the task structure: The cues were given a binary value of zero or
one, and they varied in their cue weights; that is, in their importance for predicting the
criterion. In principle, the rule-based model can perfectly solve a linear task, but
approaches multiplicative tasks less well because it is restricted to linear, additive rules.
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The exemplar model can learn to solve both types of judgment tasks perfectly, if training
exemplars are repeated. Considering as well that participants often do not reach perfect
accuracy in these judgment tasks, it is thus difficult to distinguish the exemplar model
from a rule-based model based on trained exemplars. Therefore we introduced new, unseen
objects to allow the models’ to make different predictions and to test them rigorously
against each other. From all possible items, we selected a training set of 10 old items and a
test set of 6 new items so that the rule-based model (with 5 parameters, one cue weight for
each cue and the intercept) and the exemplar model (with one sensitivity parameter and
equal attention weights) made different predictions for new items in both judgment tasks
(see Appendix A for model descriptions). As illustrated by the models’ predictions, both
models made accurate predictions for old items in the linear judgment task (measured in
root mean square deviations between model predictions and the correct criterion, RMSD =
0), but the rule-based model (RMSD = 0) predicted the criterion values of new items more
accurately than the exemplar model (RMSD = 1.93). In the multiplicative task, an
exemplar model better fitted the old items (RMSD = 0) than a rule-based model (RMSD
= 0.95) and made slightly better predictions for new items (RMSD = 1.86) than the
rule-based model (RMSD = 2.19). In comparison, a guessing model, a model predicting
the mean of the criterion values in every trial, results in a RMSD = 3.1 at the end of
training in the linear task and an RMSD = 3.2 in the multiplicative task. Exact
predictions of each model depend on the estimated parameters for each participant.
One potential problem with manipulating the strategy with different task structures
is that the task structure could also influence the ability to remember the training
exemplars. If the multiplicative task structure we chose led per se to a higher rate of
forgetting than the linear one, an exemplar-based learning model, ALCOVE (Kruschke,
1992), should predict a higher judgment error for old items in the multiplicative task than
in the linear one. We modelled forgetting by assuming interference such that over time
more and more new exemplars would be encountered that then would interfere with
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retrieving the previously learnt ones (for details see Appendix B). ALCOVE predicted that
forgetting of exemplars would cause a similar increase in judgment error for old items in
the linear and multiplicative task we used, independent of the degree of interference.
Repeating this simulation with parameters sampled from the best fitting parameters
estimated from participants’ training data similarly led to the conclusion that ALCOVE
predicts the same rate of forgetting for the linear and the multiplicative task we used. This
suggests that if judgment accuracy changes over time to a different degree in the linear and
multiplicative task, this differential forgetting cannot be explained by how easily an
exemplar-based strategy forgets the items in the two tasks.
Procedure. The judgment task consisted of a training session and three test
sessions. In the training session, participants learned to estimate the criterion values for
the 10 old items from the training set. In each trial, participants first saw a picture of a
butterfly and were asked to estimate its criterion value. Afterwards they received feedback
about the correct value, their own estimate, and the points they had earned. The training
session ended when a learning criterion was reached. Participants met this learning
criterion when judgment accuracy, as measured in root-mean-square deviation (RMSD)
between participants’ judgments and the criterion values in one training block, fell below 1
RMSD. We employed this learning criterion to minimize the possibility that differential
forgetting in judgment could have resulted from initial differences in judgment accuracy
between tasks and to achieve a high judgment accuracy at the end of training. Each
participant completed at least 10 training blocks, each consisting of the 10 old items;
training terminated after 20 blocks even if the learning criterion had not been reached.
Earlier work has set a more lenient learning criterion of 1.5 RMSD to be met within fewer
training blocks (Mata, von Helversen, Karlsson, & Cüpper, 2012; von Helversen et al.,
2010) suggesting that participants may meet our learning criterion as well within 20
training blocks. In the test sessions, participants estimated criterion values for all 16
butterflies, 10 old and 6 new ones, six times without getting any feedback. Presentation
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order in each training and test block was randomly determined.
To motivate participants to reach a high performance, participants could earn points
in every trial. Participants earned 10 points for a correct answer and 5 points if their
judgment deviated by 1 from the correct answer. At the end of the judgment tasks, the
points earned were converted to a monetary bonus (500 points = 1 CHF). In addition,
participants earned a bonus of 5 CHF if they reached the learning criterion for the
judgment task within 20 training blocks. Participants returned to the lab after 24 h as well
as after one week to repeat the test session of the judgment task.
Results
Learning success at the end of training. Overall, the number of participants
reaching the learning criterion varied slightly between the judgment tasks, but the
difference was not significant, χ2(1) = 2.20, p = .138. In the linear judgment task, 25 out
of 40 participants reached the learning criterion (62.5%), whereas in the multiplicative task
32 out of 40 participants (80%) mastered the training phase successfully. Among those
participants who did not learn the task, three participants in the multiplicative task and
four participants in the linear task did not outperform a guessing model. Descriptively,
participants needed slightly more training blocks in the linear than in the multiplicative
task, t(78) = 1.6, p = .108 (see Table 2 for descriptive statistics). The number of training
blocks participants needed was highly correlated with judgment error in both tasks (linear:
r = .75; multiplicative: r = .78). Taken together, participants learned the judgment tasks
on average equally well suggesting that the multiplicative task was not more difficult than
the linear one.
Judgment performance over time. According to our hypothesis, increasing the
retention interval between training and test should increase judgment error more in the
multiplicative than in the linear judgment task. This increase in judgment error should be
most pronounced for old items because people should be more likely to forget specific
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training exemplars than previously learned rules. To compare judgment performance for
old items across time, we measured judgment error in the training session as the RMSD
between participants’ judgments in the last training block and the correct criterion.
Judgment error in the three test sessions (immediate test, test after 1 day, and after 1
week) was measured as the RMSD between the criterion and participant’s judgments,
averaged over the six presentations in each test session. Figure 2 shows judgment error for
old and new items in each test session separately for the linear (white bars) and the
multiplicative judgment task (gray bars). Descriptively, participants achieved a similar
accuracy level for old items at the end of training in the linear and the multiplicative
judgment task. Judgment error in the linear task is equally high (even slightly lower) as in
studies using a similar design (Mata et al., 2012; von Helversen et al., 2010). In the linear
judgment task, judgment error remained constant across time from immediate test to the
next day to one week (d = -0.07 from last block of training to one week using an effect size
based on the change score for repeated measures, Morris & DeShon, 2002). In the
multiplicative task, however, judgment error rose for old items from immediate test to the
next day to a week later (d = 0.70 from last block of training to one week).
To test the hypothesis that a longer retention interval harms exemplar-based
judgments more than rule-based judgments on old training items we conducted a
repeated-measures ANOVA using judgment error for old items as the dependent variable;
judgment task (linear vs. multiplicative) was included as the between-factor and session
(training, immediate test, test after 1 day, and test after 1 week) as the within-factor. Tests
for the within-factor were corrected for sphericity using the Greenhouse-Geisser method.
The type of judgment task did not affect judgment error, F (1, 78) = 0.4, η2 = .004, p =
.531, but participants made less accurate judgments in later test sessions, F (2.4, 184.4) =
5.9, η2 = .009, p = .002. Furthermore, session interacted with the type of judgment task,
F (2.4, 184.4) = 7.7, η2 = .01, p < .001, suggesting that judgment error increased more over
time in the multiplicative than in the linear judgment task. To further investigate in which
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sessions judgment error increased the most, we set Bonferroni-corrected contrasts on the
marginal means for judgment error in the different sessions. Specifically, we compared
judgment error in one session to the average error of the subsequent sessions to identify
between which sessions judgment error increased. In the multiplicative task, comparing
judgment error at the end of training to average judgment error in the three test sessions
suggested that participants made more errors in the test sessions than at the end of
training, ∆xˆ = 0.41 (∆xˆ reflects the difference in estimated least square means), SE =
0.07, t(234) = 5.6, p < .001. Judgment error further increased from immediate test to the
two delayed tests, ∆xˆ = 0.21, SE = 0.08, t(234) = 2.8, p = .038, but did not change from
the delayed test after a day to test after one week, ∆xˆ = 0.10, SE = 0.09, t(234) = 1.10, p
= 1.00. In the linear judgment task, judgment error increased neither from the last block
of training to the three test sessions, nor from immediate test to delayed tests, nor from
one day to one week (all ∆xˆ < |0.06|, all p = 1.00). 1
With regard to new items, judgment error descriptively increased in the
multiplicative judgment task from immediate test to delayed test after a day and test after
a week (d = 0.26 from immediate to one week). Likewise, judgment error increased for new
items in the linear judgment task from immediate test to test after one day to test after
one week (d = 0.33). Reflecting the descriptive results, a repeated measures ANOVA
(Greenhouse-Geisser corrected) indicated that participants made worse judgments on new
items in the multiplicative judgment task than in the linear judgment task, F (1, 78) =
14.9, η2 = .15, p < .001, and judgment error rose in later test sessions, F (1.6, 128.3) = 5.1,
η2 = .01, p = .01, but the type of judgment task did not affect how strongly judgment
error increased over the test sessions, F (1.6, 128.3) = 0.2, η2 < .01, p = .745.
1 Excluding participants based on the learning criterion slightly changed results suggesting in addition that
participants in the linear task performed better across all sessions, F (1, 55) = 6.7, η2 = .08, p = .012, but
judgment error still increased across sessions, F (2.4, 130.0) = 12.9, η2 = .06, p < .001, and increased more
strongly in the multiplicative than in the linear task, F (2.4, 130.0) = 5.0, η2 = .03, p = .006. The pattern
for strategy use remained the same so that we report results for all participants.
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Taken together, we found that prolonging the retention interval between training and
test increased judgment errors on old training items in the multiplicative judgment task,
but not in the linear judgment task. If participants had to generalize their judgment to
new items, we found that participants in the multiplicative judgment task made on average
more errors than participants in the linear judgment task. A longer retention interval,
however, did not increase judgment error on new items more in the multiplicative than in
the linear task.
Judgment strategies over time. Previous research (Bourne et al., 2006) has
suggested that a long retention interval leads to a shift from exemplar-based strategies to
rule-based strategies because people cannot retrieve previously encountered exemplars and
instead they relearn the task by applying a rule. According to this hypothesis, participants
in the multiplicative judgment task should shift from exemplar-based strategies in the
immediate test to rule-based strategies after a week. However, in contrast to Bourne et al.
(2006), in our study participants had the possibility to repeatedly practice their judgment
strategy both in the immediate test and after a day, making it likely that they did not need
to abandon an exemplar-based judgment strategy after a week. To determine how much
support is provided for the exemplar strategy over the rule-based strategy, we relied on a
cognitive modeling approach. We fitted a linear regression model serving as a rule-based
strategy and an exemplar model with four attention weights to participants’ judgments,
separately for each of the three test sessions and each participant (see Appendix A for
more details on modelling and Table A2 for participants’ strategy classifications). To
account for random guessing, we compared those models to a baseline model (a model
estimating participants’ mean judgment). All models were estimated representing
judgment errors with a beta distribution.2 For a few participants the evidence favored
most strongly the baseline model in one session or more (linear: n = 3, multiplicative: n =
3) and so we did not consider those participants further in subsequent analyses.
2 We thank an anonymous reviewer for proposing a change in the error distribution.
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Figure 3 illustrates how well the model predictions (diamonds) of the rule-based and
the exemplar model match participants’ responses (crosses) for those participants
unequivocally classified to the rule-based model (first and third row) and the exemplar
model (second and fourth row). The upper two rows illustrate model predictions and
participants’ judgments in the linear task in immediate test, test after one day and test
after one week; the lower two rows illustrate model predictions and participants’ judgments
in the multiplicative task across time. In the linear task, judgments of participants best
described by the rule-based model on average match criterion values and model predictions
well, whereas in line with the predictions of the exemplar model judgments deviate more
from the criterion values for participants best described by the exemplar model. In the
multiplicative task, participants best described by the rule-based model more likely
overestimated low criterion values and underestimated high criterion values, whereas
participants best described by the exemplar model judged the criterion values on average
more accurately.
We then calculated the evidence ratio between the exemplar strategy over the
rule-based strategy (Wagenmakers & Farrell, 2004) that expresses as a normalized
probability how much support is provided for the exemplar strategy over the rule-based
strategy ranging from 0 (evidence in favor of the rule-based strategy) to 1 (evidence in
favor of the exemplar strategy). In all test sessions, this evidence ratio was descriptively
higher in the multiplicative task than in the linear judgment task (see table 2) suggesting
that more participants were better described by an exemplar model in the multiplicative
compared to the linear task. Thus, in the linear task linear rules best described
participants’ judgments, whereas in the multiplicative task a substantial proportion of
participants seems to have preferred an exemplar-based strategy although a substantial
number of participants was still well-described by rules.
To assess how closely the judgment strategies in immediate test corresponded to the
judgment strategies after a day or after a week, we calculated Spearman’s rank correlations
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between the evidence ratios. Spearman’s r was used because it does not presume a linear
relationship, an assumption that may not be appropriate for evidence ratios close to the
bounds. In the multiplicative task, stronger evidence for the exemplar strategy in
immediate test was associated with stronger evidence for the exemplar strategy after a day,
Spearman’s r = 0.75, but the relationship was slightly less pronounced after a week,
Spearman’s r = 0.60. In the linear task, stronger evidence for the exemplar model was
similarly associated with stronger evidence for the exemplar strategy after a day,
Spearman’s r = 0.74, but slightly lower a week later, Spearman’s r = 0.50.
To investigate to what extent participants shifted between strategies as a function of
task and retention interval, we conducted a beta regression using the evidence ratio as the
dependent variable (Smithson & Verkuilen, 2006). Using a beta regression as a statistical
model is necessary because the evidence ratios are bound to scale between 0 and 1 with
most values approximating the upper or lower end of the scale (see Appendix A for a short
introduction). In nested models, effects of the independent variables, here for instance task
and retention interval, can be tested via model comparison using Likelihood ratio tests or
Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC; Smithson & Verkuilen, 2006). The log-likelihood
ratio test compares the full model against a more restricted version of the full model. The
AIC can be used to compare as well non-nested model and penalizes more complex model
by the number of model parameters. Models with smaller AIC values are preferred over
models with higher AIC values.
Overall, including judgment task as a predictor in the beta regression improved
model fit (AIC = -945) compared to a baseline model estimating only the intercept, AIC =
-938, χ2(1) = 8.3, p = .004. This main effect indicated that participants in the
multiplicative task had a higher chance than participants in the linear task that the
exemplar model outperformed the rule-based model, OR = 1.7, CI = [1.2; 2.4]. Adding the
test session as a predictor did not further improve the fit of the model, AIC = -944, χ2(2)
= 3.2, p = .200, nor did accounting for a possible interaction, AIC = -940, χ2(2) = 0.1, p =
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.949. In sum, the type of judgment task predicted which judgment strategy described
participants’ judgments best at each time point, but a longer retention interval did not
increase the number of participants best described by rules suggesting that participants did
not shift to rule-based judgment strategies in response to a longer retention interval.
Discussion
In Experiment 1, we investigated whether prolonging the retention interval affects
how accurately people make judgments in two different kinds of judgment tasks: a linear
judgment task that can best be solved by abstracting linear, additive rules and a
multiplicative judgment task that can better be approached by storing and retrieving
exemplars from long-term memory. In line with our hypothesis, we found that judgment
accuracy for old items encountered in training dropped more from training to recall after a
week in the multiplicative than in the linear judgment task. In the linear judgment task,
participants judged —on average —old items as accurately after a week as at the end of
training, whereas judgment errors increased from the last training block to test after a
week in the multiplicative judgment task. This result matches previous research suggesting
that people remember abstracted knowledge, for instance in the form of prototypes, better
than single instances after a long retention interval (Homa et al., 1973; Posner & Keele,
1970; Robbins et al., 1978) and supports the idea that exemplar-based judgments build to
a stronger extent on episodic memory than rule-based judgments (Hoffmann et al., 2014).
Replicating previous work on judgment strategies (Hoffmann et al., 2014; Juslin et al.,
2008), we found that more participants were best described by an exemplar model in the
multiplicative task than in the linear task. With regard to the question of how judgment
strategies developed over time, our results suggest that participants relied consistently on
the same judgment strategy across time: In the linear task, most participants were still best
described by a rule-based strategy after a week. Similarly, an equal number of participants
were best described by the exemplar model in immediate test and after one week. This
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result suggests that participants still tried to retrieve previously encountered exemplars
after one week. This finding differs from previous research (Bourne et al., 2006) suggesting
that people prefer relearning complex categorizations by relying on rules, although they
stated that they previously solved the task by retrieving exemplars from memory.
One reason why participants potentially did not shift from an exemplar-based
strategy to a rule-based strategy is that they had the possibility to repeatedly practice their
judgment strategy. Practicing a task even without getting feedback can benefit long-term
retention in a wide range of tasks from free recall to function learning and may outperform
studying the correct solution (Kang, McDaniel, & Pashler, 2011; Karpicke & Roediger III,
2008). One explanation why practice is so beneficial for retention focuses on the idea that
those repeated retrieval processes may strengthen the memory trace by elaboration, deeper
encoding or adding multiple retrieval routes (Roediger & Karpicke, 2006). It is possible
that asking participants to solve the judgment task immediately, after one day, and after
one week, involved such repeated retrieval processes. Therefore, our design that tried to
track individual paths of forgetting might have prevented a high amount of forgetting in the
judgment task. To circumvent the possibility that repeated practice may have restricted
the amount of forgetting, we tested in a second experiment whether forgetting impacts
judgments more and participants shift to a greater extent to rule-based strategies if they do
not have the opportunity to repeatedly practice the judgment task at several time points.
Experiment 2: Forgetting over time without repeated practice
In Experiment 2, we studied how forgetting affected participants’ judgments if they
did not have the possibility to practice their judgment strategy between training and a later
test. As in Experiment 1, participants learned to solve either a linear or a multiplicative
judgment task in a training session. To induce forgetting, we asked participants to rejudge
these old items as well as new items either immediately after training or after one week.
In addition, we assessed recognition memory for old items in a two-alternative
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forced-choice test. Past research has found that participants who possess a better episodic
memory are more likely to adopt an exemplar-based strategy and, in turn, make more
accurate judgments in multiplicative tasks (Hoffmann et al., 2014). This suggests that
people using an exemplar strategy may remember better which objects they encountered
during training than rule users. In contrast, if participants in the linear task only learned
to abstract rules, they should not be able to discriminate old from new exemplars.
However, there is some research suggesting that the relationship between recognition and
strategy use is more complex. First, if people are asked to recognize the previously
encountered exemplars in a recognition test they are better at remembering items violating
a salient knowledge structure, for instance a rule, than items following the knowledge
structure (Davis, Love, & Preston, 2012; Palmeri & Nosofsky, 1995; Sakamoto & Love,
2004). Second, the more salient the rules are in these rule-plus-exception tasks, the better
the exceptions violating the rule are remembered (Sakamoto & Love, 2004). This result
could indicate that also rule users can perform well in a multiplicative task if they can
remember the exceptions to the rule well. Lastly, it has been found in rule-plus-exception
tasks that previously encountered items consistent with a rule show a recognition
advantage over novel items implying that people possess some residual memory for old
exemplars, although they abstracted a rule (Palmeri & Nosofsky, 1995). Accordingly, it is
possible that learners in the linear judgment task encode both a rule-based and an
exemplar-based representation and therefore show as well a recognition advantage for
previously encountered old items over new items. This recognition advantage may then
reduce differences in recognition performance between strategies and tasks.
Method
Participants. 142 participants (115 female, 27 male, MAge = 24.3, SDAge = 6.4)
were recruited at the University of Basel. Participants were randomly assigned to one of
the four conditions: 35 to the linear task with immediate recall, 37 to the linear task with
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recall after a week, 33 to the multiplicative task with immediate recall and 37 to the
multiplicative task with recall after a week. Two participants who did not show up for the
test session after one week were excluded from the study (one participant in the linear, and
one in the multiplicative task) as were three participants who were assigned to the wrong
condition. Participants received course credit or 20 Swiss Francs (CHF) per hour for
participating in the experiment. In addition, they could earn a performance-dependent
bonus (M = 5.17 CHF, SD = 2.68 CHF). The training session took about an hour,
whereas the test session took approximately thirty minutes.
Procedure. Material and procedure followed closely the experimental set-up of
Experiment 1. Participants were randomly assigned to the linear or the multiplicative
judgment task. In contrast to Experiment 1, we varied the retention interval between
training and test between participants: Half of the participants in each judgment task
solved the test session immediately after training whereas the other half returned to the lab
after a week.
After participants completed the test session, they solved a two-alternative
forced-choice recognition test. In each trial, participants saw one "old" butterfly —that is,
one they already knew from training —and one "new" butterfly —that is, a butterfly from
the test set introduced in the test session. Participants had to determine which of those
two butterflies was "old"; that is, the one they already knew from training. All 10 old
butterflies were presented twice with each of the 6 new butterflies, resulting in 120 forced
choice decisions.
Results
Learning success at the end of training. As in Experiment 1, the number of
participants reaching the learning criterion did not vary strongly between the judgment
tasks and the retention intervals, χ2(4) = 3.7, p = .448. In the linear judgment task, 20 out
of 35 participants (57.1%) assigned to immediate test reached the learning criterion as did
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19 out of 36 participants (52.8%) assigned to test after a week. The multiplicative task was
mastered successfully by 23 out of 31 participants (74.2%) assigned to immediate test and
by 21 out of 35 participants (60.0%) assigned to the test one week later. Among those
participants who did not learn the task, five participants in the linear task (immediate: 2,
one week later: 3) and 12 participants in the multiplicative task (immediate: 4, one week
later: 8) did not outperform a random guessing model. Table 3 displays descriptive
statistics for both judgment tasks, separately for immediate test and test after one week.
In the multiplicative task, participants needed —on average —slightly fewer training blocks
than participants in the linear judgment task, but this difference did not reach significance,
t(135) = 1.8, p = .071. As in Experiment 1, judgment error in the last training block and
the number of training blocks needed were highly correlated ranging from r = .69 in the
linear task for test after a week to r = .77 in the linear task for immediate test. In sum,
these results suggest that participants did not solve the linear task more easily than the
multiplicative task.
Judgment performance over time. As in Experiment 1, we expected a longer
retention interval to impede judgment accuracy most severely on old items in the
multiplicative judgment task. Figure 4 illustrates judgment error on old and new items for
the last block of training and the test session, separately for the judgment tasks and
retention intervals (see Table 3 for descriptive statistics). In the linear judgment task,
participants who took the immediate test were descriptively as accurate on old items in
test as in the last block of training (d = -0.19, d based on the change score for repeated
measures, Morris & DeShon, 2002, ∆xˆ = -0.09, SE = 0.14, ∆xˆ for difference in marginal
means), whereas participants who solved the test session a week later made more errors on
old items in test than in the last block of training (d = 0.21, ∆xˆ = 0.21, SE = 0.14). In
the multiplicative judgment task, participants who took the immediate test made only
slightly more errors on old items in test than in the last block of training (d = 0.24, ∆xˆ =
0.15, SE = 0.15), whereas participants who solved the test session a week later made worse
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judgments on old items in test than in the last block of training (d = 0.64, ∆xˆ = 0.74, SE
= 0.14). Finally, participants who solved the linear judgment task a week later made on
average fewer errors than participants who solved the multiplicative task, d = -0.57.
To test the hypothesis that a longer retention interval harms exemplar-based
judgments more than rule-based judgments for old items we conducted a repeated-measures
ANOVA on judgment error using retention interval, judgment task, and session (training
vs. test) as independent variables. Overall, participants made fewer errors in the last
training block than in test, F (1, 133) = 12.2, η2 = .01, p < .001, but the judgment task did
not affect judgment errors, F (1, 133) = 2.1, η2 = .01, p = .150. A longer retention interval
increased judgment error, F (1, 133) = 6.9, η2 = .04, p = .010. An interaction between
retention interval and session indicated that judgment error increased more strongly
between training and test for those participants who took the test after a week than
immediately, F (1, 133) = 9.4, η2 = .01, p = .003. Further, an interaction between judgment
task and session indicated that judgment error increases more from training to test for
participants in the multiplicative task than for participants in the linear task, F (1, 133) =
7.1, η2 = .01, p = .009. Yet, in contrast to our hypothesis that a longer retention interval
contributes to more errors in the multiplicative than in the linear judgment task, neither
the interaction between retention interval and judgment task, F (1, 133) = 0.5, η2 = .003, p
= .476, nor the three-way interaction was significant, F (1, 133) = 1.0, η2 = .001, p = .320.3
With regard to new items, participants in the linear task descriptively made more
errors if they were tested a week later than if they took an immediate test (d = 0.10).
Similarly, in the multiplicative task participants who were tested after a week made less
accurate judgments than those who took an immediate test (d = 0.41). Furthermore,
participants made less accurate judgments in the multiplicative task than in the linear task
both in immediate test (d = 0.57) and after a week (d = 0.88). To investigate how a longer
3 Excluding participants based on the learning criterion did not change results for judgment accuracy on
old items nor for strategy classifications.
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retention interval affected judgment errors for new items we conducted an ANOVA on
judgment error using retention interval and judgment task as independent factors.
Judgments were less accurate in the multiplicative compared to the linear task, F (1, 133)
= 18.0, η2 = .12, p < .001, but neither retention interval, F (1, 133) = 2.1, η2 = .02, p =
.150, nor its interaction with the type of task affected judgment accuracy, F (1, 133) = 0.7,
η2 < .01, p = .412.
In sum, a longer retention interval impeded judgment accuracy on old items in both
judgment tasks. Judgment error increased more from training to test for those participants
who took a delayed test after a week than for those who took an immediate test.
Furthermore, participants in the multiplicative judgment task were less successful at
generalizing their performance to new items than participants in the linear task,
independent of the retention interval.
Judgment strategies over time. In Experiment 2, participants did not have the
possibility to practice their judgment strategy between training and delayed test. Without
practicing the judgment strategy, it is possible that participants shift from an
exemplar-based judgment strategy to a rule-based judgment strategy after a week (Bourne
et al., 2006). To describe judgment strategies, we fitted an exemplar model, a rule-based
model and a baseline model to participants’ judgments in each test session. As in
Experiment 1, we excluded for all subsequent analyses those participants for whom the
evidence favoured a baseline model in the linear (immediate: n = 1; one week: n = 2) and
the multiplicative task (immediate: n = 3; one week: n = 4). For all remaining
participants, the evidence ratio favoured the rule-based model in the linear task (see table
3). In the multiplicative task, the evidence ratio supported more strongly the exemplar
model in immediate test, but provided more support for the rule-based model in test after
a week.
Figure 5 illustrates —analogously to Figure 3 —model predictions as well as
participants’ average responses for participants unambiguously classified to the rule and
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the exemplar model. The upper two rows illustrate model predictions and participants’
judgments in the linear task in immediate test and test after one week; the lower two rows
illustrate model predictions and participants’ judgments in the multiplicative task across
time. In the linear task, model predictions and participants’ responses for the rule-based
model more closely match the criterion values, whereas model predictions and participants’
responses showed a higher variability for the exemplar model. In the multiplicative task,
judgments of participants classified to the exemplar model were better calibrated in
immediate test, whereas participants and model predictions for the rule-based model
suggested an overestimation of smaller criterion values. Furthermore, the plots highlight
that after one week participants’ judgments as well as the model predictions on average
match the criterion values less well than in immediate test.
To understand how strategies may change depending on the type of judgment task
and retention interval, we conducted a beta regression using the evidence ratio as the
dependent variable and judgment task as well as retention interval as predictors. Overall,
this analysis suggested that including judgment task as a predictor improved model fit
(AIC = -409) compared to a baseline model estimating only the intercept, AIC = -406,
χ2(1) = 4.7, p = .03. Furthermore, adding retention interval as a predictor suggested a
main effect of retention interval, AIC = -417, χ2(1) = 9.7, p = .002. Yet, these main effects
were qualified by an interaction between judgment task and retention interval, AIC = -422,
χ2(1) = 7.6, p = .006. The interaction model suggested that the evidence ratio favoured
the exemplar model in the multiplicative task compared to the linear task, OR = 3.7, CI =
[1.9; 7.3] and that across both tasks the retention interval did not change the evidence for
the exemplar model, OR = 0.83, CI = [0.46; 1.51]. Yet, in the multiplicative task evidence
for the exemplar model was reduced a week later, OR = 0.28, CI = [0.11; 0.68]. Taken
together, those results indicate that participants may have shifted from a memory-based
exemplar strategy in immediate test to a rule-based strategy after a week.
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Predicting recognition memory with judgment strategies. Finally, we
assessed in both tasks to what extent strategy use can predict recognition memory for
previously encountered exemplars across time. On the one hand, participants relying on an
exemplar-based strategy may rely more on episodic memory and discriminate old from new
items better than participants relying on rules. On the other hand, it is possible that also
rule-based learners may possess some residual memory for old exemplars (Palmeri &
Nosofsky, 1995) and are likewise able to discriminate old from new items. Overall,
participants correctly recognized 63.0% (recognition rate, SD = 18 %) of all old items. In
the linear judgment task, the recognition rate was higher in test after a week than in
immediate test (see Table 3). In the multiplicative task, participants recognized the old
items slightly worse after a week than in immediate test.
To investigate how judgment strategies and retention interval affected recognition
memory, we conducted a logistic regression using the number of correctly and incorrectly
recognized old items as dependent variable and predicted this success rate with retention
interval, judgment task, and judgment strategy, as measured with the evidence ratio. Tests
of parameter estimates were conducted with a Likelihood ratio test. Overall, this logistic
regression model described the data well, AIC = 2796 (compared to AIC = 2931 for the
null model), Nagelkerke’s R2 = 0.69, with on average a higher recognition rate in the linear
than in the multiplicative judgment task, χ2(1) = 36.7, p < .001. Furthermore, this
analysis suggested a three-way interaction between judgment task, retention interval, and
judgment strategy, χ2(1) = 15.0, p < .001.
Therefore, we broke up this interaction by separately analyzing the judgment tasks.
In the linear task, participants had a higher recognition rate after a week than in
immediate test, χ2(1) = 45.7, p < .001, OR = 1.37, CI = [1.23, 1.52]. Furthermore,
participants who were more likely better described by the rule-based model recognized
more old items correctly than participants more likely better described by the exemplar
model, χ2(1) = 15.5, p < .001, OR = 0.81, CI = [0.68, 0.95]. The recognition rate at
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different retention intervals did not vary with the evidence provided for each model, χ2(1)
= 0.8, p = .374, OR = 0.89, CI = [0.68, 1.16].
In the multiplicative task, Likelihood ratio tests suggested that participants overall
had a lower recognition rate after a week than in immediate test, OR = 0.84, CI = [0.72,
0.98], χ2(1) = 6.7, p = .010, and the recognition rate varied with the evidence for the
exemplar model χ2(1) = 22.6, p < .001. Yet, these main effects were qualified by an
interaction, χ2(1) = 20.9, p < .001. This interaction suggested that the evidence for the
exemplar model did not change recognition rate per se, OR = 1.08, CI = [0.92, 1.28], but
after a week stronger evidence for the exemplar model led to a higher recognition rate, OR
= 1.89, CI = [1.44, 2.49].
Figure 6 shows the recognition rate for each old item, plotted over participants’
average judgment for this item considering only those participants who are unequivocally
classified to one strategy. The graph illustrates that participants who are classified to the
rule-based model in the linear task recognize old items better than participants who are
classified to the exemplar model. In the multiplicative task, after a week participants
classified to the exemplar model recognize old items better than participants who are
classified to the less suitable strategy. However, exemplar users also show larger standard
errors than rule-users after a week indicating that recognition memory has a higher
variability. The reason for this finding is possibly that only a few participants still adopt
an exemplar-based strategy after one week.
Discussion
Instead of tracking the individual course of forgetting, Experiment 2 varied the
retention interval between participants to reduce the possibility that repeated practice of
judgment strategies limited the decline of judgment accuracy over time. In line with the
results from Experiment 1, we found that participants in the multiplicative task judged old
items less accurately in immediate test than in training, whereas participants in the linear
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judgment task kept their performance in immediate test. In contrast to our hypothesis,
however, judgment error increased more strongly in a delayed test after a week not only in
the multiplicative task, but also in the linear judgment task. Accordingly, a longer
retention interval harmed judgments both in the multiplicative and in the linear judgment
task. Furthermore, in contrast to Experiment 1, judgment strategies were not stable over
time, but changed across time: In immediate test, participants were likely better described
by the rule-based model in the linear task, whereas the evidence preferred an exemplar
model in the multiplicative task. After a week, however, participants relied less on an
exemplar model in both judgment tasks suggesting that if participants do not have the
opportunity to practice an exemplar-based judgment process, they shift to a greater extent
to rule-based strategies.
General discussion
The passage of time makes it harder to remember previously learned knowledge
(Ebbinghaus, 1885; Rubin & Wenzel, 1996), but it can also impede previously acquired
skills, such as speaking foreign languages (Bahrick, 1984). Although forgetting affects a
wide range of cognitive abilities, only a few studies in judgment research have paid
attention to such basic memory phenomena. Our research tried to shed light on the
question of how a longer retention interval may change the knowledge people retrieve to
make a judgment and, ultimately, judgment accuracy. Reinterpreting judgment tasks as
paired-associates learning tasks, we argued that people may need to form different
associations when learning to solve rule-based and exemplar-based judgment tasks: In
rule-based judgments, people should associate each cue with its importance, whereas they
need to associate exemplars with their corresponding criterion value in exemplar-based
judgments. In a later test phase, people retrieve either previously learned rules or
exemplars. Specifically, we hypothesized that storing a range of similar exemplars may
make exemplar-based judgments highly vulnerable to forgetting, whereas rules receive more
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training, are likely generalized to a range of different objects, and may hence be forgotten
less easily. We tested this hypothesis in two experiments: In a first experiment that tracked
judgment performance over a week we found that judgment error on old items increased
more within this week in the multiplicative than the linear judgment task, reflecting the
idea that forgetting over time harms successful retrieval of single exemplars more than
retrieval of rules. Varying the retention interval between groups in a second experiment, we
found that judgment performance on old items decreases not only in multiplicative tasks,
but also in linear ones indicating that previously learnt rules can also be forgotten.
Looking more closely at the temporal curve of forgetting, we found that judgment
error for previously encountered items in the multiplicative task already increased between
the end of training and immediate test in both experiments, whereas participants in the
linear judgment task kept their performance from training to immediate test. Possibly,
introducing new items in the multiplicative task already interferes with retrieving old
training exemplars so that participants likely confuse old training items with novel items.
Yet, our results provide mixed evidence for the idea that prolonging the retention interval
leads to a greater amount of forgetting in exemplar-based than in rule-based judgment. In
line with previous research suggesting that forgetting does not act on abstracted knowledge
like prototypes (Homa et al., 1973; Posner & Keele, 1970; Robbins et al., 1978) we found in
Experiment 1 that participants in the linear judgment task were able to retain a high
judgment accuracy even after a week, whereas participants in the multiplicative task made
more errors in the delayed tests. In Experiment 2, however, a delayed test harmed
judgment accuracy to the same degree in the multiplicative, exemplar-based judgment task
as in the linear, rule-based judgment task. This result matches previous findings suggesting
that actual rule-based judgments can also fluctuate over time (Balzer et al., 1983), but
stands in contrast to research suggesting that abstracted knowledge is immune to
forgetting (Homa et al., 1973; Posner & Keele, 1970; Robbins et al., 1978). One reason why
people better retain rule-based judgments in Experiment 1 is possibly that they were able
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to apply the rules learned in training immediately to new test items so that the learned
rules are less vulnerable to forgetting in the delayed tests. Limiting this opportunity to
practice the judgment strategy, as in Experiment 2, may have restricted not only repeated
retrieval of exemplars, but also the generalization of rules to new items. Taken together,
those results point towards the view that not only exemplars may be forgotten over a
longer time interval, but people may also experience difficulties to retrieve previously
learned rules after a long time. Future research may seek to unravel on a more fine-grained
level the degree to which specific mechanisms of forgetting, such as decay or interference,
underlie forgetting in rule and exemplar retrieval.
When participants had to generalize the learned knowledge to new items, we found
that participants in the multiplicative task were rather bad at judging new items. A
plausible reason for this high number of judgment errors is that we selected the new items
so that they strongly discriminate between the strategies, but both strategies did not
generate a high performance on new items in the multiplicative task. Accordingly, we used
the new items primarily to distinguish the judgment strategies and not to evaluate
performance.
The stability of judgment strategies and exemplar memory over time
The question of how stable people’s judgment strategies are over time is of high
practical relevance (Ashton, 2000). One line of research has argued that people’s judgment
weights may fluctuate only to a small degree over time (Balzer et al., 1983), whereas other
researchers have proposed that the time that has passed critically influences the strategy
people follow (Bourne et al., 2006). Our study unites those divergent ideas: If participants
had the opportunity to repeatedly practice their judgment strategy, we found that their
judgment policies were highly consistent across time indicating that repeated practice can
render people’s judgment policies temporally more stable. However, if participants did not
engage in exemplar retrieval for a long time as in Experiment 2, they shifted more towards
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rule-based strategies. These findings are consistent with the idea that people only engage
in exemplar retrieval after a long time if the exemplars can still be retrieved. However, if
previously encountered exemplars can no longer be retrieved, participants may revert to a
less appropriate rule-based strategy (Bourne et al., 2006; Olsson et al., 2006), potentially
inferring a linear relationship from any knowledge they can still recover. For instance, if
people still remember which cues to focus their attention on or are able to retrieve at least
two exemplars, they might use this knowledge to infer a linear, additive relationship.
To assess to what extent people still possess some memory for specific exemplars after
a week, we additionally measured recognition memory in Experiment 2. Interestingly, the
ability to discriminate old from new items varied in both judgment tasks as a function of
the retention interval and strategy used: In the multiplicative task, exemplar and rule users
were equally successful in discriminating between old and new items in immediate test;
however, a week later, participants classified to the exemplar model more accurately
discriminated between old and new items than participants classified to the rule-based
model —a finding further supporting the idea that those participants who have a worse
memory for previously encountered exemplars try to reinstate their judgment by applying
rules. In turn, in the linear task, participants who were best described by the
task-appropriate rule-based strategy better recognized old items than participants best
described by the exemplar model. Furthermore, on average, participants more accurately
discriminated between old and new items in the linear than the multiplicative task. This
finding matches well with the idea that judgment accuracy potentially decreases in the
multiplicative task because participants can no longer discriminate old from new items. In
combination, our results highlight that rule-based learners likewise store a memory trace of
previously seen exemplars (Palmeri & Nosofsky, 1995; Sakamoto & Love, 2004).
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Restrictions in training duration
In our study, we tried to equate learning performance by setting a strict learning
criterion, but participants could achieve this learning criterion after a variable number of
learning blocks. We used this learning criterion because participants solving a
multiplicative task often achieve a higher performance than participants in the linear task
after the same number of training blocks (Hoffmann et al., 2014, 2016). In our study,
participants in the multiplicative task also reached the learning criterion slightly faster
than participants in the linear task. This result may hint at the alternative interpretation
that training may have prematurely stopped in the multiplicative task and therefore
participants may have remembered their judgments less well. Two arguments speak against
this interpretation. First, if participants in the multiplicative task reached the learning
criterion by chance, they should make more errors in the blocks preceding the last training
block than participants who passed the learning criterion in the linear task. Yet, in the
three blocks before the learning criterion was reached, judgment error is comparable in the
linear and the multiplicative judgment task in most conditions. Second, if participants
remembered their judgments less well because they solved a fewer number of training
blocks, participants who needed more training blocks to reach the learning criterion should
show a lower rate of forgetting. Yet, participants who reached the learning criterion in the
multiplicative task after 15 or more training blocks made on average more errors than
participants who reached the criterion earlier in training. Furthermore, judgment error
increased more strongly from training to test for participants who needed more blocks. In
sum, those results make it unlikely that training stopped too early in the multiplicative
task.
Implications for training
From a broader perspective, considering which knowledge people are more likely to
forget may inform our understanding about how people can best acquire this knowledge
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and retain it for a long time. For instance, the knowledge about categories that people
retain after a longer time interval depends on how they learned the task (Sakamoto &
Love, 2010). Yet people do not always structure their learning in a way that facilitates
later retrieval, neither in education (Bjork, Dunlosky, & Kornell, 2013) nor when learning
abstract concepts (Tauber, Dunlosky, Rawson, Wahlheim, & Jacoby, 2013). Our study
contributes to a new branch of research in function learning and categorization studying
how to construct specific training procedures to improve categorization decisions over a
long time interval. This line of research has investigated how manipulations that improve
long-term retention may help category or function learning and generalization, ranging
from spaced training (Carvalho & Goldstone, 2014; McDaniel, Fadler, & Pashler, 2013;
Zulkiply & Burt, 2013) to testing effects (Kang et al., 2011) to optimal training exemplars
(Giguere & Love, 2013; Hornsby & Love, 2014). For instance, spacing exemplar
presentations improves memory performance for trained items and simplifies generalization
to new items (McDaniel et al., 2013). Our study emphasizes that identifying the
underlying task structure and the strategies people use to approach the task can help to
adapt those training procedures. Specifically, if rules can be abstracted as in linear
judgment tasks, it may be sufficient to test those rules out on new items and distribute
training across time to achieve high judgment accuracy and adequate generalization. In
contrast, multiplicative tasks require that participants identify and retrieve specific
exemplars. Introducing new probes interferes with retrieval of those exemplars suggesting
that successful training procedures potentially need to tackle this identification problem.
Conclusions
Since Ebbinghaus’s (1885) seminal work much research has been devoted to the study
of forgetting. Our study highlights that forgetting prior knowledge can similarly restrict
how accurately people make judgments after some time has passed —not only if people
need to retrieve past experiences, but also if they need to established a judgment policy
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based on abstracted knowledge. Identifying how abstracted knowledge and past
experiences can best be retained may thus help improve human judgments in different
domains from weather forecasts to business.
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Table 1
Task Structure in Experiment 1
Cue values Linear Task Multiplicative Task Item Type
C1 C2 C3 C4 Criterion Rule Exemplar Criterion Rule Exemplar
0 0 0 0 10 10 10 10 9.1 10 Old
0 0 0 1 11 11 11 10 10.1 10 Old
0 0 1 0 12 12 12 11 9.9 11 Old
0 0 1 1 13 13 13 11 11.0 11 Old
0 1 0 1 14 14 14 12 12.7 12 Old
0 1 1 0 15 15 15 12 12.6 12 Old
0 1 1 1 16 16 16 13 13.6 13 Old
1 0 1 0 16 16 16 13 14.9 13 Old
1 1 1 0 19 19 19 18 17.5 18 Old
1 1 1 1 20 20 20 20 18.6 20 Old
0 1 0 0 13 13 13 11 11.7 11.3 New
1 0 0 0 14 14 13 12 14.1 11.5 New
1 0 0 1 15 15 11 12 15.1 10 New
1 0 1 1 17 17 16.3 14 15.9 14.7 New
1 1 0 0 17 17 19 14 16.7 18 New
1 1 0 1 18 18 17 16 17.8 16 New
Note. The judgment criterion was derived from Equation 1 (linear) and Equation 2
(multiplicative).
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Table 3
Performance and Evidence Ratio in Experiment 2. Standard Error in
Parentheses.
Judgment Task
Linear Multiplicative
Retention interval Retention interval
Immediate 1 week Immediate 1 week
Training session
Number of blocks 15.9 (0.7) 16.9 (0.6) 14.6 (0.7) 15.7 (0.7)
Error last block 1.33 (0.16) 1.52 (0.21) 1.34 (0.21) 1.63 (0.23)
Test session
Error old items 1.24 (0.16) 1.73 (0.19) 1.49 (0.16) 2.37 (0.18)
Error new items 1.86 (0.19) 1.96 (0.15) 2.42 (0.14) 2.79 (0.16)
Evidence ratio .23 (.07) .14 (.05) .69 (.08) .15 (.06)
Recognition % correct 61.6 (3.4) 69.2 (2.9) 62.6 (3.1) 58.4 (2.9)
Note. Error was measured as the RMSD (Root Mean Squared Deviation) between
participant’s judgment and the criterion.
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Figure 1 . Sample species of butterflies with distinct cue values on all cues.
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Figure 2 . Judgment error measured in root-mean squared deviation (RMSD) on old items
(Panel A) and new items (Panel B) in Experiment 1. White bars depict judgment error in
the linear judgment task, gray bars depict judgment error in the multiplicative judgment
task. A. Judgment error on old items was assessed for each participant in the last block of
training as well as in all three test sessions (immediate test, test after 1 day, test after 1
week). B. Judgment error on new items was assessed for each participant in all three test
sessions. Error bars indicate ± 1 SE.
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Figure 3 . Model predictions and participants’ judgments in Experiment 1 averaged across
those participants clearly best described by either the rule-based model or the exemplar
model, separately for the linear (upper two rows) and the multiplicative judgment task
(lower two rows) and test session (immediate test, test after one day, or test after one week,
in columns). Diamonds depict average model predictions; crosses depict participants’
average judgments. The black diagonal lines depict perfectly accurate judgments.
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Figure 4 . Judgment error measured in root-mean squared deviation (RMSD) on old items
(Panel A) and new items (Panel B) in Experiment 2. White bars depict judgment error in
the linear judgment task, gray bars depict judgment error in the multiplicative judgment
task. A. Judgment error on old items was assessed for each participant in the last block of
training as well as after a short retention interval (immediate test) or a long retention
interval (test after one week). B. Judgment error on new items was assessed for each
participant after either a short retention interval (immediate test) or a long retention
interval (test after one week). Error bars indicate ± 1 SE
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Figure 5 . Model predictions and participants’ judgments in Experiment 2 averaged across
those participants clearly best described by either the rule-based model or the exemplar
model, separately for the linear (upper two rows) and the multiplicative judgment task
(lower two rows) and test session (immediate test or test after one week, in columns).
Diamonds depict average model predictions; crosses depict participants’ average judgments.
The black diagonal lines depict perfectly accurate judgments.
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Figure 6 . Proportion of correctly recognized old items (recognition rate) plotted against
the average judgment for this old item in the last block of training, separately for
participants classified to the rule-based (black diamonds) and the exemplar-based
judgment strategy (white circles). Panel A depicts the recognition rate for participants
who solved the linear task and took an immediate test. Panel B depicts the recognition
rate for participants who solved the linear task and took the test after a week. Panel C
and D show the recognition rate in the multiplicative task for immediate test and test after
a week, respectively. Error bars indicate ± 1 SE.
.
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Appendix A
Cognitive modeling of judgment strategies
To identify the cognitive strategies that people rely on in the three test sessions, we used a
computational modeling approach. We compared how well a prominent rule-based model, a
regression model, described participants’ judgments in comparison to one often-used
exemplar model using four attention weights. We compared all models to a guessing model
that assumed that participants’ judgments vary around participants’ mean judgment on
each trial. The guessing model estimated two free parameters: participants’ mean
judgment and the fitted dispersion parameter φ (see the paragraph on model estimation).
Model description
Rule-based model. To model rule-based strategies, we fitted a linear regression
model that has often served as the prototypical rule-based strategy in judgment tasks
(Cooksey, 1996; Juslin et al., 2003). The linear regression model allows combining several
cues in a linear additive fashion. Accordingly, the estimated criterion value yˆp of an object
p is the weighted sum of the cue values xpi:
yˆp = k +
4∑
i=1
wi · xpi (3)
where wi are the cue weights for each cue i and k is a constant intercept. In sum, the linear
model estimates six parameters: four cue weights wi, one intercept k, and the dispersion
parameter.
Exemplar model. Exemplar models have been widely used in judgment and
categorization research to model retrieval of single instances from long-term memory
(Hoffmann et al., 2014; Juslin et al., 2003). In exemplar models, the similarity S(p, q)
between the probe p and exemplar q is an exponential decay function of the distances dpq
between the objects (Nosofsky & Zaki, 1998).
S(p, q) = e−dpq (4)
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Thus, smaller distances between the probe p and exemplar q indicate a higher similarity
between theses objects. To determine this distance, the cue values xpi of probe p are
compared to the cue values xqi of exemplar q on all cues i. The more the cue values match
each other, the smaller is the distance between the objects (Nosofsky & Johansen, 2000).
dpq = h(
4∑
i=1
wi|xpi − xpq|) (5)
The sensitivity parameter h determines how strongly similarity decays with distance.
Smaller sensitivity parameters indicate that similarity declines less with distance. The
attention weights wi, summing to one, weigh how much attention each cue or dimension
receives. To account for judgments, Juslin et al. (2003) assumed that the criterion value cq
of an exemplar is stored together with its cue values in memory. To estimate the criterion
value of a new probe yˆp, the criterion values yq for each exemplar are weighted by the
similarities.
yˆp =
Q∑
q=1
S(p, q) · cq
Q∑
q=1
S(p, q)
(6)
In sum, the exemplar model estimates five parameters: three attention weights wi, the
sensitivity parameter h, and the dispersion parameter.
Model estimation and comparison. To evaluate the models’ relative
performance we fitted all models to participants’ judgment on all six presentations of old
and new items, separately for each of the three test sessions (immediate test, test after a
day, and test after a week). The models were evaluated based upon the Bayesian
Information Criterion (BIC; Schwarz, 1978). All models were fitted to participants’
responses by minimizing the deviance -2LL, the negative summed log-likelihood L of the
model given the data.
−2LL = −2 ·∑ ln(L) (7)
We calculated the likelihood for participants’ judgments j assuming a beta distribution to
account for the bounded scale between 10 and 20. Because the beta distribution is not
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defined for the open interval ] 0, 1 [, participants’ judgments and the correct criterion values
for the exemplar model were re-scaled to the range 0.05 to 0.95. To make the interpretation
of the parameter values easier, we followed the method for the beta regression suggested by
Smithson and Verkuilen (2006) and re-formulated the shape parameters so that they
represent a location parameter µ and a dispersion parameter φ (for a detailed explanation
see Smithson & Verkuilen, 2006). The location parameter µ represented the model’s
prediction for this item, yˆp, whereas the dispersion parameter φ was estimated based on
φ = e−b0 . Because the rule-based model would allow to predict criterion values below 0 or
above 1, we used a logistic link function as in the logistic regression to strictly keep the
model’s predictions in range. The estimated parameter values in the beta regression can
then be interpreted in a similar fashion as in the logistic regression. For the rule-based
model we provide here all estimated location parameters in the form of odds ratios (as in
the beta regression analyses on evidence ratios), whereas the dispersion parameter is not
transformed. Note that we do not need to apply the logistic link to the location parameter
of the exemplar model because it does not extrapolate beyond the range of encountered
values. Accordingly, the estimated parameter values in the exemplar model do not change
their meaning. The likelihood of the beta distribution can finally be formulated as
L = Beta(yˆpφ, φ− yˆpφ; j) (8)
To compare which model described participants’ responses better, we calculated the
BIC for each model. The BIC can be used to compare non-nested models and penalizes
more complex models by accounting for the number of free model parameters k:
BIC = −2LL+ k lnn, (9)
where n denotes the number of observations. Smaller BIC values indicate a better model
fit. BICs were converted into BIC weights BICw,M that give the posterior probability of
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each model given the data (Wagenmakers & Farrell, 2004).
BICwM =
e−.5∆BICM∑
i
e−.5∆BICi
(10)
with ∆ BICM as the difference between model M and the best model MB in the set and ∆
BICi as the difference between the model i and the best model.
Detailed results for model comparisons in Experiment 1
Table A1 lists the mean and standard deviation of the model parameters as well as
b0. To facilitate interpretability, the weights wi and the intercept k in the rule model as
well as the guessing model were transformed into odds ratios. Attention weights wi do not
need to be transformed into odds ratios, but were transformed to reflect relative attention
weights and the sensitivity parameter h.
Table A2 shows the average BIC for each model, average BIC weights, and strategy
classifications for each task and retention interval. Overall, the average BIC was lower for
the rule-based model in all tasks and conditions. Yet, to what degree the BIC favoured one
over the other model strongly varied across participants, and ranged for instance in the
immediate test session from ∆BICRule−Ex = -3167 to ∆BICRule−Ex = 120. Furthermore, if
we only consider ∆BICM−MB < −5 as sufficient evidence for one model (Donkin, Newell,
Kalish, Dunn, & Nosofsky, 2014), not all participants were consistently classified to one
model in the linear or the multiplicative task (Table A2) and it varied across sessions for
which participant a strategy could be clearly identified. Because BIC differences and
classification consistency vary across participants, we quantified the evidence in favour of
each model using BIC weights. On average, these BIC weights provide more evidence for
the rule-based model in the linear task, but evidence is more evenly distributed among the
rule-based and the exemplar-based model in the multiplicative task. When finally
analyzing strategy use over time, we excluded those participants for whom the evidence for
the guessing model outweighed the evidence for the rule-based and the exemplar model
(BICw > .5) in any session (three participants in both tasks) and calculated the evidence
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ratio for the exemplar model over the rule-based model as a normalized probability,
BICw,Ex/(BICw,Ex + BICw,Rule).
Detailed results for model comparisons in Experiment 2
Table A4 displays BIC weights, strategy classifications based on BIC weights, and the
RMSD between model responses and participants’ judgments. Similar to Experiment 1,
BIC weights for the guessing model as well as the number of participants classified to the
guessing model were low with a slightly higher number of participants classified to the
guessing model in the multiplicative task. In the linear task, the majority of participants
were best described by the rule-based model both in the immediate test session as well as
in test after one week, as shown by high average BIC weights for the rule-based model and
a high number of participants classified to that model. The exemplar model better
described participants’ judgment in the immediate test in the multiplicative task, as
suggested by higher BIC weights and more participants classified to the model. In test
after one week, however, the rule-based model provided a higher BIC weight and more
participants were classified to the rule-based model.
Table A3 lists the mean and standard deviation of the model parameters; table A4
shows the average BIC for each model, average BIC weights, and strategy classifications for
each participant. As in Experiment 1, the average BIC is in most conditions lower for the
rule-based model than for the exemplar model, except for immediate test in the
multiplicative task. Similarly, the BIC weights provide a higher evidence for the rule-based
model than for the exemplar model or the guessing model in most conditions, but provide
a higher evidence for the exemplar model in immediate test in the multiplicative task. As
in Experiment 1, not all participants were consistently classified to one strategy based
upon the differences in BIC. Furthermore, slightly more participants were classified to a
guessing model in the multiplicative than in the linear task. As in Experiment 1, we
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excluded those participants for whom the evidence for the guessing model outweighed the
evidence for the rule-based and the exemplar model and calculated the evidence for a
rule-based model over an exemplar model for each of the remaining participants.
FORGETTING IN JUDGMENT 61
Table A1
Model parameters in Experiment 1. SD in Paranthesis
RI Task Model w1 w2 w3 w4 k h b0
Imm.
Lin
Guess – – – – 1.0 (0.1) – -1.1 (0.3)
Rule 4.1 (2.3) 3.5 (1.9) 2.5 (1.7) 1.5 (0.5) 0.2 (0.2) – -2.9 (1.0)
Ex .29 (.20) .29 (.31) .28 (.24) .15 (.28) – 85 (71) -2.6 (0.8)
Mult
Guess – – – – 0.7 (0.2) – -0.9 (0.3)
Rule 6.8 (5.0) 3.3 (2.1) 1.8 (1.1) 1.6 (0.7) 0.2 (0.2) – -3.0 (4.8)
Ex .40 (.29) .15 (.19) .15 (.19) .30 (.36) – 82 (75) -2.3 (0.8)
1 day
Lin
Guess – – – – 1.0 (0.1) – -1.1 (0.3)
Rule 4.6 (3.5) 3.6 (2.2) 2.4 (1.1) 1.5 (0.6) 0.2 (0.2) – -3.1 (1.2)
Ex .32 (.21) .25 (.25) .30 (.21) .13 (.24) – 98 (77) -2.7 (0.8)
Mult
Guess – – – – 0.7 (0.2) – -0.9 (0.3)
Rule 6.9 (5.2) 3.6 (2.7) 2.2 (1.6) 1.9 (1.8) 0.1 (0.2) – -2.6 (0.8)
Ex .52 (.31) .12 (.19) .25 (.29) .11 (.26) – 89 (59) -2.4 (0.8)
1 week
Lin
Guess – – – – 1.0 (0.2) – -1.1 (0.3)
Rule 4.5 (3.3) 4.1 (3.7) 2.5 (1.6) 1.5 (0.7) 0.2 (0.2) – -3.2 (1.2)
Ex .38 (.22) .22 (.24) .30 (.22) .09 (.16) – 106 (81) -2.7 (0.85)
Mult
Guess – – – – 0.7 (0.2) – -0.9 (0.3)
Rule 7.4 (5.5) 3.4 (2.3) 2.6 (3.7) 1.8 (1.3) 0.1 (0.2) – -2.6 (0.7)
Ex .42 (.31) .16 (.24) .18 (.23) .23 (.35) – 107 (76) -2.4 (0.8)
Note. RI = Retention interval, Imm. = Immediate, Guess = Guessing model, Rule = Rule-based model, Ex
= Exemplar model, w1 - w4 = cue weights in the linear model and attention weights in the exemplar model,
respectively, k = Intercept in the linear model, h = sensitivity parameter in the exemplar model, b0 =
dispersion.
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Table A2
BIC, BICw, and strategy classification in Experiment 1. SD for BIC weights in Paranthesis
Indicator Model
Linear Task Multiplicative Task
Immediate One day One Week Immediate One day One Week
BIC
Guess -5 (17) -4 (15) -3 (10) -9 (21) -8 (15) -8 (16)
Rule -157 (96) -175 (111) -186 (107) -188 (484) -140 (74) -143 (69)
Exemplar -129 (69) -140 (77) -137 (81) -106 (79) -120 (87) -120 (87)
BICw
Guess .07 (.24) .05 (.22) .03 (.16) .05 (.22) .03 (.16 ) .04 (.19)
Rule .67 (.42) .67 (.45) .84 (.35) .43 (.48) .50 (.49) .60 (.48)
Exemplar .26 (.39) .28 (.42) .13 (.31) .51 (.49) .47 (.50) .36 (.47)
NCL
incons. 9 5 3 4 3 4
Guess 2 2 1 2 1 1
Rule 23 24 33 16 18 22
Exemplar 6 9 3 18 18 13
Note. SD = Standard Deviation; BIC = Bayesian Information Criterion, BICw = Bayesian Information
Criterion weights, NCL = number of participants classified, incons. = inconsistent classification, Guess =
Guessing model, Rule = Linear model, Ex = Exemplar model.
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Table A3
Model parameters in Experiment 2. SD in Parenthesis
RI Task Model w1 w2 w3 w4 k h b0
Imm.
Lin
Guess – – – – 1.0 (0.2) – -1.1 (0.3)
Rule 4.5 (3.1) 2.9 (1.5) 3.5 (4.5) 1.5 (0.6) 0.2 (0.3) – -3.0 (0.9)
Ex .38 (.25) .14 (.20) .37 (.28) .11 (.22) – 95 (73) -2.7 (0.8)
Mult
Guess – – – – 0.7 (0.2) – -0.9 (0.4)
Rule 5.4 (4.7) 2.9 (1.8) 2.3 (1.9) 1.4 (0.8) 0.2 (0.2) – -2.0 (0.7)
Ex .33 (.26) .24 (.26) .19 (.23) .24 (.31) – 88 (70) -2.2 (0.7)
1 week
Lin
Guess – – – – 1.1 (0.3) – -1.0 (0.3)
Rule 4.1 (2.9) 3.3 (3.6) 2.3 (2.1) 1.5 (0.6) 0.5 (0.8) – -2.5 (1.0)
Ex .38 (.31) .19 (.23) .21 (.23) .23 (.32) – 104 (81) -2.1 (0.85)
Mult
Guess – – – – 0.8 (0.2) – -1.0 (0.6)
Rule 3.9 (3.5) 2.7 (2.7) 1.7 (1.5) 1.4 (0.8) 0.3 (0.4) – -1.8 (0.6)
Ex .39 (.39) .24 (.32) .16 (.23) .21 (.37) – 64 (70) -1.6 (0.6)
Note. RI = Retention interval, Guess = Guessing model, Rule = Rule-based model, Ex = Exemplar model,
w1 - w4 = cue weights in the linear model and attention weights in the exemplar model, respectively, k =
Intercept in the linear model, h = sensitivity parameter in the exemplar model, b0 = dispersion.
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Table A4
BIC, BICw, and strategy classification in Experiment 2. SD in Parenthesis
Indicator Model
Linear Task Multiplicative Task
Immediate One Week Immediate One Week
BIC
Guess -4 (15) -3 (17) -17 (30) -20 (51)
Rule -164 (89) -124 (85) -96 (59) -75 (53)
Exemplar -134 (74) -85 (81) -100 (77) -46 (64)
BICw
Guess .03 (.17) .05 (.22) .11 (.31) .12 (.32)
Rule .75 (.40) .81 (.35) .27 (.40) .74 (.41)
Exemplar .23 (.38) .14 (.30) .62 (.46) .13 (.31)
NCL
incons. 6 7 6 6
Guess 1 1 3 4
Rule 24 25 6 22
Exemplar 4 3 16 3
Note. BIC = Bayesian Information Criterion, BICw = Bayesian Information
Criterion weights, NCL = number of participants classified, incons. =
inconsistent classification, Guess = Guessing model, Rule = Linear model, Ex
= Exemplar model.
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Appendix B
Modeling forgetting of exemplars
We modelled forgetting of exemplars by using a successful exemplar-based learning model,
ALCOVE (Kruschke, 1992). ALCOVE assumes that learning in judgment tasks can be
understood as gradually forming associative links between the exemplars that are
encountered and the possible criterion values. Judgments are a function of the similarity of
the probe to the previously encountered exemplars and of the association strengths
between the exemplars and the criterion values. That is, the probe activates similar
exemplars, which in turn activate criterion values they are associated with. Association
strengths are then translated into output probabilities for each criterion value and the final
judgment is the mean of the criterion values weighted by their probabilities. ALCOVE
contains three free parameters, two learning parameters and a sensitivity parameter: The
first learning parameter determines the speed with which the associations between criterion
values and exemplars are formed. The second learning parameter determines how fast
people learn to differentially distribute attention to the features of the objects and changes
how similarity between the probe and learnt exemplars is computed. The sensitivity
parameter regulates how similarity is translated into the activation of an exemplar.
We introduced forgetting in ALCOVE by assuming that over time further exemplars
would be encountered that interfere with previously learnt information. New information
updates both the association between exemplars and stored criterion values as well as
learned attention towards specific cues. For each simulation, we randomly drew 1000 times
from an exponential distribution for the two learning parameters (with M = 1) and the
sensitivity parameter (with M = 3). The value of 1 for the learning parameters was chosen
to mimic the pattern that usually the values of the learning parameters are quite small, but
may in judgment tasks also take values larger than 1. For the sensitivity parameter, we
assumed that in our task participants mostly have a specific representation of the
exemplars (most sensitivity parameter values are above 1), but some participants may have
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a more unspecific representation. In addition, we estimated ALCOVE’s parameters for
each individual in Experiment 1 using the training data and performed the same
simulations with the bootstrapped parameters.
Training followed the same schedule as in the experiment, but we introduced four
additional random cues in the simulation to limit catastrophic forgetting (French, 1999), a
well-known problem in machine learning (Hasselmo, 2017; McCloskey & Cohen, 1986).
Specifically, if we used only four cues and ALCOVE learned new random patterns, it would
instantaneously forget everything it learned so far, as the new items that are described by
the same cues as the old items would require the model to overwrite the learnt associations.
To avoid this problem, a common strategy is to add a few more random cues, so that the
new items that are learned do not completely overlap with the old information. To
introduce forgetting, ALCOVE continued to learn N random item profiles between training
and test (N varied from 0 to 100 in steps of 10). Finally, ALCOVE made the same
judgments for old exemplars in test as participants did.
